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Overruling Roe v. Wade:
Lessons from the Death Penalty
Paul Benjamin Linton*

Abstract
In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Supreme Court struck down the Georgia
and Texas death penalty statutes, thereby calling into question the validity of
every other state death penalty statute. In their concurring opinions, Justices
Brennan and Marshall expressed the view that, given society’s gradual
abandonment of the death penalty, capital punishment violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Justice
Powell and three other justices dissented, arguing that the Court had misread
the state of the law regarding society’s acceptance of the death penalty. Four
years after Furman, in a quintet of cases, the Court held that the death penalty
could be imposed under properly drafted statutes, upholding three of the
challenged statutes and striking down the other two. Seven of the nine
justices, in separate concurring and dissenting opinions in Gregg v. Georgia
(1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana (1976), agreed that, in Furman, Justices
Brennan and Marshall had misjudged America’s view of the death penalty.
They noted that, since Furman, at least thirty-five States, as well as Congress,
had enacted new statutes authorizing the death penalty. Those developments
* Mr. Linton is an attorney in private practice who specializes in state and federal constitutional
law, legislative consulting, and scholarly writing. He has submitted amicus curiae briefs on beginningof-life and end-of-life issues in the United States Supreme Court, most of the federal courts of appeals,
and more than one-half of all the state reviewing courts in the United States. He has published two
dozen law review articles on a wide variety of subjects, including the history of abortion regulation,
assisted suicide, criminal law, sex discrimination, state equal rights amendments, and religious
freedom guarantees under state constitutions. In January 2020, he published the third edition of his
book, ABORTION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Carolina Academic Press), the only comprehensive
analysis of abortion as a state constitutional right. Mr. Linton received his undergraduate and law
degrees from Loyola University of Chicago. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the
Thomas More Society (Chicago, Illinois) and its President and Chief Counsel, Thomas Brejcha, for
their support and encouragement in the research and writing of this article.
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undercut the assumptions upon which the abolitionists’ argument rested and
demonstrated that a large proportion of American society continued to regard
the infliction of the death penalty as “an appropriate and necessary
sanction.”
This article argues that, just as Justices Brennan and Marshall misread
the “signs of the times” regarding the death penalty in Furman, so, too, did
the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade (1973), when it effectively struck down the
abortion statutes of all fifty States. Roe placed great weight on the facts that
seventeen States had liberalized their abortion laws and that leading
professional organizations favored the repeal or substantial revision of state
abortion laws. Roe, however, ignored that fact that the other thirty-three
States had not liberalized their statutes and that, in thirty-one of those States,
bills to relax or eliminate restrictions on abortion were introduced, but never
enacted. Of even greater significance is that, in the almost fifty years since
Roe was decided, the overwhelming majority of state legislatures have
rejected Roe and its refusal to recognize that unborn human life is worth of
protection. States have passed resolutions calling for constitutional
amendments to overturn Roe, retained pre-Roe laws prohibiting abortion,
enacted post-Roe laws that would prohibit abortion upon the overruling of
Roe, enacted a myriad of statutes that prohibit abortions before viability and
extended the protection of the law to unborn children in a variety of areas
outside the context of abortion, including criminal law, tort law and health
care law. The article submits that, just as the Court had to revisit the issue of
the constitutionality of the death penalty in light of society’s reaction to
Furman, so, too, the Court should revisit the issue of abortion in light of the
country’s massive repudiation of Roe.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Furman v. Georgia, decided on June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court
struck down the Georgia and Texas death penalty statutes, thereby calling into
question the validity of every other state death penalty in the United States.1
Less than seven months later, on January 22, 1973, the Court decided Roe v.
Wade, effectively striking down the abortion statutes of all fifty states.2 A
comparison of the reasoning in the two cases is illuminating. In each case,
the Court (or individual Justices in the majority) clearly believed that the
decision reflected the direction in which society and the law was moving. In
Furman, this belief was based on what two Justices in the majority (Justice
Brennan and Justice Marshall) understood to be the gradual abandonment of
the death penalty by the states; in Roe, it was based on the trend, as the Court
viewed it, toward the relaxation or elimination of any restrictions on the
reasons for which abortion could be performed. In both cases, the Justices’
beliefs played a critical role in their decisions to strike down the death penalty
and abortion prohibitions.
Four years after Furman, seven of the nine Justices, in a quintet of
challenges to five newly-enacted death penalty statutes,3 acknowledged that
the Court in Furman had seriously misread where the country was going on
the issue of the death penalty.4 Almost fifty years after Roe, however, the
Court has yet to acknowledge that it misread where the country was going on
the equally controversial issue of abortion. If the Court’s retrenchment on the
death penalty provides any guidance, it is long past time for the Court to
reexamine and overrule Roe v. Wade for, as this article argues, the states’
repudiation of Roe is as overwhelming and dramatic as their repudiation of
Furman.

1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
4. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176–87 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Roberts, 428
U.S. at 350–56 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., and Rehnquist, J.). Those
opinions are discussed below in the text. See infra Section II.D.

264

[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]

Overruling Roe v. Wade
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

II. FURMAN V. GEORGIA
In three consolidated cases decided on June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court
struck down the Georgia and Texas death penalty statutes.5 In a oneparagraph per curiam opinion, the Court held, without any elaboration or
analysis, that “the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these
cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”6 Each of the five Justices joining the per curiam
opinion—Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart, Justice White,
and Justice Marshall—filed a separate opinion in support of the judgments.7
None of these Justices formally concurred in any of the opinions written by
the other four Justices. Two of the Justices who joined the per curiam
opinion—Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall—based their support of the
Court’s judgments in part on what they regarded as American society’s
gradual abandonment of the death penalty as an appropriate punishment, even
in the most heinous cases.
A. Justice Brennan’s Concurrence in Furman
Based on his examination of “the history and present operation of the
American practice of punishing criminals by death,” Justice Brennan
concluded that the death penalty “has been almost totally rejected by
contemporary society.”8 Justice Brennan cited a number of factors in support
of this conclusion: First, the methods of inflicting the death penalty had
(supposedly) become more humane, replacing hanging and the firing squad
with electrocution and lethal gas.9 Second, society no longer “countenance[s]
the spectacle of public executions, once thought desirable as a deterrent to
criminal behavior by others,” but now regards them as “debasing and

5. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The other two cases were Jackson v. Georgia, No.
69–5030, and Branch v. Texas, No. 69–5031. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
6. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and
unusual punishments,” and, by virtue of the “incorporation doctrine,” is applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; id. amend. XIV,
§ 1. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
7. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
8. Furman, 408 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 296–97.
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brutalizing to us all.”10 Third, there had been a drastic reduction in the crimes
for which states actually inflicted the death penalty, which included the
phenomenon of jury nullification, i.e., juries refusing to convict defendants of
crimes for which capital punishment was mandatory.11
Finally, Justice Brennan found it “significant” that, at the time Furman
was decided, “nine States no longer inflict the punishment of death under any
circumstances, and five others have restricted it to extremely rare crimes,”12
and six other states, “while retaining the punishment on the books in generally
applicable form, have made virtually no use of it.”13
[T]he history of this punishment is one of successive restriction.
What was once a common punishment has become, in the context of
a continuing moral debate, increasingly rare. The evolution of this
punishment evidences, not that it is an inevitable part of the American
scene, but that it has proved progressively more troublesome to the
national conscience. The result of this movement is our current
system of administering the punishment, under which death
sentences are rarely imposed and death is even more rarely inflicted.14
Justice Brennan noted that “[j]uries . . . have been able to bring themselves
to vote for death in a mere 100 or so cases among the thousands tried each
year where the punishment is available. Governors . . . have regularly
commuted a substantial number of those sentences[,]” and society’s insistence
upon due process of law, “to the end that no person will be unjustly put to
death, thus [ensures] that many more of those sentences will not be carried

10. Id. at 297.
11. Id. at 297–98 (citation omitted).
12. Id. at 298 (footnotes and citations omitted).
13. Id. at 298 n.53 (citation omitted).
14. Id. at 299. As Justice Powell noted in his dissent, “little weight can be given to the lack of
executions in recent years.” Id. at 434–35 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting). “A de facto moratorium has
existed for five years now while cases challenging the procedures for implementing the capital
sentence have been re-examined by this Court.” Id. And the “infrequency of executions during the
years before the moratorium become fully effective may be attributable in part to decisions of this
Court giving expanded scope to the criminal procedural protections of the Bill of Rights, especially
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,” and in part to “decisions of the early 1960’s amplifying the
scope of the federal habeas corpus remedy.” Id. (citations omitted).
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out.”15 “In sum, we have made death a rare punishment today.”16 “The
progressive decline in, and the current rarity of, the infliction of death,”
according to Justice Brennan, “demonstrate that our society seriously
questions the appropriateness of this punishment today.”17 The “virtually
total” rejection of the death penalty “by contemporary society” was one of the
four grounds on which Justice Brennan concluded that the infliction of the
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment.18
B. Justice Marshall’s Concurrence in Furman
In his concurring opinion in Furman, Justice Marshall expressed the view
that “the death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that
violates the Eighth Amendment.”19 But, he added, “even if capital
punishment is not excessive, it nonetheless violates the Eighth Amendment
because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this
time in their history.”20 In support of this conclusion, he relied in part on the
trend toward limiting the circumstances under which states could inflict the
death penalty, or even eliminating it as an authorized punishment.21
C. Justice Powell’s Dissent in Furman
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Furman.22 In his dissent, Justice Powell said,
“Any attempt to discern contemporary standards of decency through the
review of objective factors must take into account several overriding
considerations which petitioners choose to discount or ignore.”23 “In a
15. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring). For Justice Powell’s discussion of the incidence and
significance of jury verdicts of death, see id. at 439–41 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 434–36 & nn.18–
19.
16. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 305. The other grounds identified by Justice Brennan were that the death penalty “is an
unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability that it is inflicted
arbitrarily[;]” and “there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than
the less severe punishment of imprisonment.” Id.
19. Id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 360.
21. Id. at 333–42.
22. Id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 436.
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democracy,” Justice Powell emphasized, “the first indicator of the public’s
attitude must always be found in the legislative judgments of the people’s
chosen representatives.”24 And what were those judgments at the time
Furman was decided? “Forty States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal
Government still authorize the death penalty for a wide variety of crimes,” a
number that had “remained relatively static since the end of World War I.”25
Congress authorized the death penalty in 1961 for aircraft piracy, in 1965 for
presidential and vice-presidential assassinations, and in 1971 for
congressional assassination.26 “In four states the death penalty ha[d] been put
to a vote of the people through public referenda—a means,” Justice Powell
observed, “likely to supply objective evidence of community standards.”27 A
referendum to abolish capital punishment in Oregon failed in 1958, but was
subsequently approved in 1964; the death penalty was approved by
overwhelming margins in binding referenda in Colorado in 1966 and in
Illinois in 1970, while an advisory referendum in Massachusetts in 1968
recommended retention of the penalty.28 Significantly, of the forty states that
had retained the death penalty, half of those states introduced bills to modify
or repeal the death penalty, only one of which (in Delaware) became law—all
of the other bills either never emerged from a committee or were defeated
(usually by a lopsided vote) on the floor.29 “This recent history of activity
with respect to legislation concerning the death penalty,” Justice Powell
found, “abundantly refutes the abolitionist position.”30
Summarizing his analysis of the “objective factors” regarding the death
penalty, Justice Powell concluded that “the indicators most likely to reflect
the public’s view—legislative bodies, state referenda and the juries which
have the actual responsibility—do not support the contention that evolving

24. Id.; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (“[T]he primary and most reliable
indication of [a national] consensus is . . . the pattern of enacted laws.”).
25. Furman, 408 U.S. at 437 (Powell, J., dissenting). At the time Furman was decided, nine states
had abolished the death penalty by statute, while the death penalty in a tenth state (California) had
been struck down on state constitutional grounds by the state supreme court. See People v. Anderson,
493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
26. Furman, 408 U.S. at 437 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 438.
28. Id. at 438–39 (citations omitted). The author recalls voting in the Illinois referendum, in which
the issue of the death penalty was one of four issues submitted separately from the vote on approving
or rejecting the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
29. Id. at 439 (citation omitted).
30. Id.
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standards of decency require total abolition of capital punishment.”31 To the
contrary, “the weight of the evidence indicates that the public generally has
not accepted either the morality or the social merit of the views so passionately
advocated by the articulate spokesmen for abolition.”32
D. The Court Revisits Furman
Four years after Furman (and three and one-half years after Roe), the
Court upheld the death penalties of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, while striking
down the death penalties authorized by North Carolina and Louisiana.33 In
the joint opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia,
and the dissenting opinion authored by Justice White in Roberts v. Louisiana,
in which Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist
joined, seven of the nine Justices acknowledged that Justices Brennan and
Marshall had completely misread America’s view of the death penalty in their
concurring opinions in Furman.
The joint opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg v.
Georgia said that “developments during the four years since Furman have
undercut substantially the assumptions upon which [the abolitionists’]
argument rested.”34 “[I]t is now evident that a large proportion of American
society continues to regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and
necessary criminal sanction.”35 In support of this conclusion, the joint opinion
noted that “[t]he legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted new statutes
that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the
death of another person,” while Congress, in 1974, “enacted a statute
providing the death penalty for aircraft piracy that results in death.”36 “The
most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty for
murder is the legislative response to Furman,” the joint opinion said, and that
response made clear that “capital punishment itself has not been rejected by

31. Id. at 442.
32. Id. at 442–43.
33. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 179–80 (citations omitted).
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the elected representatives of the people.”37 Moreover, in the only statewide
referendum occurring since Furman, “the people of California adopted a
constitutional amendment that authorized capital punishment, in effect
negating a prior ruling by the Supreme Court of California . . . that the death
penalty violated the California Constitution.”38
In his dissenting opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana, Justice White, writing
for himself, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist,
noted that, in their concurring opinions in Furman, Justices Brennan and
Marshall had expressed the view that “the death penalty had become
unacceptable to the great majority of the people of this country and for that
reason, alone or combined with other reasons, was invalid under the Eighth
Amendment, which must be construed and applied to reflect the evolving
moral standards of the country.”39 “That argument,” Justice White wrote,
“whether or not accurate at that time, when measured by the manner in which
the death penalty was being administered under the then-prevailing statutory
schemes,[40] is no longer descriptive of the country’s attitude.”41 Like the joint
opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia, Justice
White noted in Roberts that since Furman, “Congress and 35 state legislatures
re-enacted the death penalty for one or more crimes,” and that the California
Constitution “was amended by initiative and referendum to reinstate the
penalty (with approximately two-thirds of those voting approving the
measure).”42 “With these profound developments in mind,” Justice White
wrote, “I cannot say that capital punishment has been rejected by or is
offensive to the prevailing attitudes and moral presuppositions in the United
States or that it is always an excessively cruel or severe punishment or always
a disproportionate punishment for any crime for which it might be imposed.”43

37. Id. at 179, 180–81.
38. Id. at 181 (citation omitted).
39. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 351–52 (White, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court struck
down the Louisiana death penalty challenged in Roberts and the North Carolina penalty challenged in
Woodson on grounds independent of those advanced by Justices Brennan and Marshall in their
separate concurrences in Furman. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331–36 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.,), Woodson, 248 U.S. at 282–304 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
40. For the reasons set forth in Justice Powell’s dissent in Furman, discussed above, it is doubtful
whether that argument accurately described the country’s attitude toward the appropriateness of the
death penalty in 1972. See Furman v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 238, 414–65 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 352 (White, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 352 & n.5.
43. Id. at 353.
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“These grounds for invalidating the death penalty,” Justice White concluded,
“are foreclosed by recent events, which this Court must accept as
demonstrating that capital punishment is acceptable to the contemporary
community as just punishment for at least some intentional killings.”44
III. ROE V. WADE
Less than seven months after the Supreme Court decided Furman v.
Georgia, the Court decided Roe v. Wade,45 recognizing a right to abortion for
any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason thereafter.46 The
effect of the decision was to overturn the abortion laws of all fifty states.
Nineteen years after Roe, a bare majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
viability rule, holding that “[r]egardless of whether exceptions are made for
particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from making
the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”47
In its survey of evolving attitudes toward abortion, the Court in Roe noted
that the American Medical Association, the American Public Health
Association, the American Bar Association, and the American Law Institute

44. Id. The author takes no position on whether, or under what circumstances, the death penalty
should be inflicted or, for that matter, whether the death penalty, as administered, violates the Eighth
Amendment. Rather, the point of citing the Court’s death penalty decisions is to demonstrate how
faulty factual premises may lead to erroneous legal conclusions and, further, that the Court’s
understanding of what the American people think about a given issue and the Court’s confident
predictions—express or implied—of the direction in which American society is moving on a given
issue may be deeply mistaken.
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. Under Roe, the states have no authority to prohibit abortion
before viability, and any prohibition of abortion after viability must make exceptions for the pregnant
woman’s life or health. Id. (summarizing holdings). Given the very expansive definition of health in
Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, it is doubtful that any meaningful restrictions may be placed
on the reasons for which a post viability abortion may be performed. Doe, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)
(“[T]he medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these
factors may relate to health.”). And indeed, no attempt to limit post-viability abortions has ever been
upheld. See Paul Benjamin Linton & Maura K. Quinlan, Does Stare Decisis Preclude Reconsideration
of Roe v. Wade? A Critique of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283, 333–36
& nn.266–92 (2019) (discussing cases challenging statutes restricting post-viability abortions).
47. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). Casey also reaffirmed
Roe’s holding that “‘subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of
human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.’” Id. (quoting
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65).
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(ALI) (in the Model Penal Code) had all recommended that legal restrictions
on abortion be substantially relaxed and that abortion be allowed either on
demand (at least until late in pregnancy) or under a very broad range of
circumstances.48 Section 230.3(2) of the Model Penal Code, for example,
authorized an abortion if there was “substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
mother[49] or that the child would be born with grave physical or mental
defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious
intercourse.”50 The Court noted that “[f]ourteen States have adopted some
form of the ALI statute,”51 and that by the end of 1970, four other states “had
repealed criminal penalties for abortions performed in early pregnancy by a
licensed physician, subject to stated procedural and health requirements.”52
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139–47.
49. Experience has demonstrated that providing an exception for the mental health of the mother
is inherently manipulable and, therefore, no different in practice from an abortion-on-demand statute.
See People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257, 265 (Cal. 1972). According to data cited by the California
Supreme Court in a challenge to the California Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1967, more than 60,000
abortions were authorized and performed in 1970 for alleged “mental health” reasons, even though the
standard for invoking the exception was the same as the standard for civil commitment, i.e., the
pregnant woman had to pose a danger to herself or to others or to the property of others. Id. It is
absurd to believe that more than 60,000 women met the standard for civil commitment merely because
they were pregnant. Id. California, it must be emphasized, was the only State that attempted to restrict
the scope of a mental health exception, which suggests that similar exceptions in other state pre-Roe
abortion statutes were likely abused as well.
50. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 230.3(2) (“Justifiable Abortion”). Two physicians, one of whom could
be the physician performing the abortion, had to certify in writing “the circumstances which they
believe to justify the abortion.” Id. at § 230.3(3) (“Physicians’ Certificates”). Section 230.3 provided
no mechanism by which the physicians’ certifications that the abortion was “justified” could be
reviewed either administratively or judicially. Id. Moreover, the model provision did not prohibit
self-abortions or abortions performed by third persons who were not licensed physicians unless the
pregnancy had “continued beyond the twenty-sixth week.” Id. at § 230.3(4) (“Self-Abortion”). The
text of § 230.3 is set out in Appendix B to the Court’s decision in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 205
(1973), the companion case to Roe. In Doe, the Court affirmed, as modified, the district court’s
judgment striking down major provisions of the Georgia abortion statute, which was based on § 230.3
of the Model Penal Code. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 202.
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 n.37. The fourteen states the Court cited as having adopted some version
of the Model Penal Code provision were Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia.
Id. The inclusion of Mississippi in this list is questionable because, in amending its “life of the mother”
only abortion law in 1966, the legislature added an exception for rape, but none of the other exceptions
set forth in the Model Penal Code provision.
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 n.37. The Court’s description of the four states that had “repealed
criminal penalties for abortions performed in early pregnancy” mischaracterized the statutes enacted
in Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington. Id. The Alaska and Hawaii statutes allowed abortions
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It is hard to imagine that the Court in Roe would have bothered to mention
the foregoing developments unless it believed that both society and the law
were moving in the direction of abolishing any meaningful restrictions on the
reasons for which abortions could be performed and also thought that such
movement, as in the case of the declining infliction of the death penalty before
Furman v. Georgia, was somehow relevant to the constitutional calculus.53
But, as was the case with Justice Brennan’s and Justice Marshall’s concurring
opinions in Furman, the Court in Roe got it wrong, both with respect to
reading the past and predicting the future.
Critique of Roe v. Wade
Prior to Roe, seventeen states adopted the Model Penal Code provision
on abortion or went even further and enacted statutes allowing abortion on
demand until late in pregnancy, but almost twice as many states (the other
thirty-three) did not do so. And in thirty-one of those states, more than 150
bills to broaden the circumstances under which abortions could be performed
were introduced in the state legislatures before Roe was decided, but were
never enacted.54 With the exception of Florida, which in 1972 enacted an
abortion statute based on the Model Penal Code in response to the state
supreme court’s decision striking down the state’s life-of-the-mother statute,55
no state relaxed its restrictions on abortion after November 1970. Moreover,
to be performed for any reason before viability which, at the time Roe was decided, did not occur until
somewhere between the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, which certainly is not
“early pregnancy.” Id. at 160. The New York statute allowed abortion for any reason until the twentyfourth week of pregnancy. The Washington statute allowed abortion for any reason up to the point of
“quickening,” usually understood to occur between the sixteenth and eighteenth week of pregnancy,
or “four lunar months,” which is sixteen weeks (a lunar month is twenty-eight days). The “health
requirements” the Court mentioned concerned only who could perform the abortion (a licensed
physician) and where the procedure could be performed (a hospital). None of the four statutes placed
any restrictions on the reasons for which an abortion could be performed.
53. This inference is supported by the Court’s statement, near the beginning of its opinion, that it
had “inquired into, and [had] place[d] some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and
what that history reveals about man’s attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries,” as
well as its statement toward the end of its opinion that its holding was “consistent” with, inter alia,
“the lessons and examples of medical and legal history.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 117, 165.
54. See infra Appendix A. A list of the bills and a brief description of what they provided is set
forth in Appendix A. To the author’s knowledge, a comprehensive list of abortion bills introduced
(but never enacted) in these thirty-one states has never been published. Prior to Roe, no bills were
introduced to amend or repeal the existing abortion laws in Louisiana or South Dakota.
55. See State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972).
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in state referenda held in November 1972, on the eve of Roe, the citizens of
Michigan and North Dakota defeated, by overwhelming margins, efforts to
relax the restrictions on abortion.56 And barely two years after New York
enacted its abortion-on-demand statute, allowing abortions for any reason up
to the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy, the state legislature voted to repeal
that statute and prohibit abortion except to preserve the life of the mother,57 a
repeal that failed only because of Governor Rockefeller’s veto.58 The Roe
opinion betrayed no familiarity with any of the foregoing.
The states’ reaction to Roe v. Wade, both at the time and in the almost
fifty years since, is even more telling. Following Roe, state legislatures, with
varying degrees of success, struggled with regulating abortion within the
limitations imposed by Roe and its progeny.59 And over time, most (but not
all) of those legislatures repealed their pre-Roe statutes prohibiting abortion,60
possibly as part of a political compromise that was necessary in order to enact
statutes regulating abortion. But notwithstanding those repeals, in at least
nine distinct ways, the overwhelming majority of states have expressed their
profound disagreement with (and rejection of) the abortion regime imposed
upon them by the Court in Roe.61
56. See infra Appendix A. The measure to allow abortion on demand in Michigan was defeated
by a margin of 3–2, and a similar measure in North Dakota was defeated by a margin of 3–1. Id.
57. See Assemb. B. 2774, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1971) (“An Act[:] To amend the penal law,
in relation to justifiable abortional acts and repealing subdivision three of section 125.05 of such law
relating thereto.”).
58. See Memorandum from Nelson A. Rockefeller, Fifty-third Governor of New York State, 179–
80 (May 13, 1972) (Public Papers of Nelson A. Rockefeller) (memorandum filed with Assemb. B.
2774).
59. See generally Joseph P. Witherspoon, The New Pro-Life Legislation: Patterns and
Recommendations, 7 ST. MARY’S L.J. 637 (1976). A comprehensive survey of state abortion statutes
as of 1990 may be found in the author’s article. See Paul Benjamin Linton, Enforcement of State
Abortion Statutes After Roe: A State-by-State Analysis, 67 U. DETROIT L. REV. 157 (1990); see also
Brief for 127 Members of the Missouri General Assembly As Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants,
Appendix B, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (listing state statutes
enacted as of February 1989).
60. See PAUL BENJAMIN LINTON, ABORTION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Carolina Academic
Press, 3d ed. 2020) (All of the repeals are noted at the beginning of each state chapter in the author’s
book.).
61. These are presented in summary form in Appendix B, infra. Five of the states identified in
Appendix B and discussed later in this article—Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, and Rhode
Island—have enacted statutes codifying Roe v. Wade and affirmatively recognizing a state (statutory)
right to abortion. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790 (2020); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 55/1–5
et seq. (West 2019) (“Reproductive Health Act”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598(1) (2020); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II, § 20-209(b) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-13.1 (2020) (“Reproductive

274

[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]

Overruling Roe v. Wade
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

(1) Nineteen states have adopted resolutions calling on Congress to
convene a constitutional convention under Article V of the Constitution for
the purpose of proposing an amendment to the United States Constitution that
would prohibit abortion or allow the states to prohibit abortion.62
(2) Twenty-three states have adopted resolutions asking Congress to
propose an abortion-related amendment to the Constitution.63 Eliminating
double-counting for states that have adopted both resolutions (thirteen states),
and deducting the one state that has rescinded all of its convention calls but
never asked Congress to propose an amendment addressing abortion
(Tennessee), there are twenty-eight states that have sought a federal
constitutional amendment—either proposed by a constitutional convention or
by Congress—that would prohibit abortion or restore the states’ authority to
do so.64

Privacy Act”). Those states are not included in the final count of states that have rejected Roe. See
infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
62. See LYNN D. WARDLE & MARY ANN WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION 211–16 (BYU
Press 1982) (listing resolutions adopted by Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah).
Because of concerns that a convention called under Article V could not be limited to the topic for
which it had been convened, eight of these states have rescinded all of their prior convention calls.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Count to Thirty-Four: The Constitutional Case for a
Constitutional Amendment, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 856 (2011) (noting that since 1993,
Idaho, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee, along with eight other states, “have rescinded any
and all of their prior convention applications”); id. at 872 (confirming that Utah has repealed “any and
all prior convention applications”). The text of the resolutions rescinding convention applications may
be found in the Appendix to Professor Paulsen’s article. Id. at 867–72. Prior to 1993, Louisiana
rescinded “any and all previous applications for a [federal] constitutional convention, ‘for any purpose,
limited or general.’” Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional
Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 773 (1993) (quoting 138 CONG. REC.
S529 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1992)). Delaware rescinded “all prior applications” to Congress “to call a
convention pursuant to Article V of the United States Constitution” in 2016. H. Res. 60, 148th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2016). Nevada followed suit in 2017. S.J. Res. 10, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess.
(Nev. 2017).
63. See WARDLE & WOOD, supra note 62, at 217 (listing memorials or requests by Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
64. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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(3) More than thirty states have recognized the medical and scientific fact
that human life begins at conception;65 have expressed a public policy to

65. See ALA. CODE § 26-23E-2(4) (2019) (“Abortion . . . involves the taking of human life.”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E) (West 2019) (requiring a woman seeking an abortion to be
informed, inter alia, that “human physical life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human
sperm”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5) (2019) (requiring a woman seeking an abortion to be
informed, inter alia, that the abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being”); id. at § 65-6710(2)(E) (stating the same information in printed materials that must be
provided to a woman seeking an abortion); id. at § 65-6732(a)(1) (legislative finding that “[t]he life of
each human being begins at fertilization”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.720(8) (West 2019) (defining
“human being” to mean “any member of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until death”); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.8 (West 2019) (declaring and finding that “the unborn child is a human being
from the time of conception”); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.102(11)(a)(2) (2019) (requiring a woman seeking an abortion to be informed, inter alia, that the
abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being”); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2019) (stating the same as North Dakota’s statute); id. at § 34-23A-1.2
(“The Legislature finds that all abortions, whether surgically or chemically induced, terminate the life
of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”). This does not include the dozens of statutes
regulating abortion that define the term “unborn child” in terms that clearly imply that human life
begins at conception. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730(A)(4) (West 2020) (defining
“unborn child” as “the unborn offspring of human beings from the moment of conception, through
pregnancy, and until live birth including the human conceptus, zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo and
fetus”).
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protect unborn human life66 and/or to prefer childbirth over abortion,67 or
otherwise “deplore the destruction of the unborn human lives” that has
resulted from the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade;68 have adopted
rules of construction conferring legal status upon the unborn child;69 and/or
66. See ALA. CONST. amend. 930 (2018) (expressing public policy “to recognize and support the
sanctity of unborn life and the rights of unborn children, including the right to life”); ALA. CODE § 2621-1(d) (2019) (parental consent statute expressing a similar public policy); id. at § 26-22-1(a)
(expressing same public policy in post-viability law); ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2 (“The policy of
Arkansas is to protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted
by the Federal Constitution.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710(5) (West 2019) (expressing legislative
intent “to recognize and to protect the lives of all human beings regardless of their degree of biological
development”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6732(a)(2) (2019) (“[U]nborn children have interests in life,
health and well-being that should be protected.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.8 (2019) (stating that an
unborn child is “a legal person” and “is entitled to the right to life from conception under the laws and
Constitution of this State”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17014(f) (West 2019) (expressing the
state’s interest in “protecting the fetus,” subject to federal constitutional limitations); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-20-102 (2019) (reaffirming the tradition of the state of Montana “to protect every human
life, whether unborn or aged, healthy or sick”); id. at § 50-20-103 (expressing legislative intent “to
restrict abortion to the extent permissible under decisions of appropriate courts or paramount
legislation”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-01 (2019) (reaffirming the tradition of the state of North
Dakota “to protect every human life whether unborn or aged, healthy or sick”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3202(a) (West 2019) (expressing the General Assembly’s intent “to protect the life and health
of the child subject to abortion”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301.1(1)–(3) (LexisNexis 2019)
(recognizing that unborn children have “inherent and inalienable rights that are entitled to protection
by the state of Utah” under the Utah Constitution, that the state of Utah “has a compelling interest in
the protection of the lives of unborn children,” and that it is the legislature’s intent “to protect and
guarantee to unborn children their inherent and inalienable right to life” as required by the Utah
Constitution).
67. See ALA. CODE § 26-21-1(d) (2019) (parental consent law); id. at § 26-22-1(a) (2019)
(expressing public policy); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-115(A), (B) (2020) (expressing the state’s
“strong interest in promoting childbirth and adoption over elective abortion”); IDAHO CODE § 399302(1)(b) (2019) (expressing public policy of the state “to promote live childbirth over abortion”);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-1 (West 2019) (“Childbirth is preferred, encouraged, and supported over
abortion.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.011 (West 2019) (expressing the policy of the state of
Minnesota that “[b]etween normal childbirth and abortion it is the policy of the state of Minnesota that
normal childbirth is to be given preference, encouragement and support by law and by state action, it
being in the best interests of the well being and common good of Minnesota citizens”); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.041 (LexisNexis 2019) (expressing the public policy of the state of Ohio “to prefer
childbirth over abortion to the extent that is constitutionally permissible”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5157 (2019) (same with respect to the public policy of Tennessee).
68. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-325(2) (2019); see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.8 (2019) (finding
and declaring that “the longstanding policy of this State . . . to protect the right to life of the unborn
child from conception by prohibiting abortion” is “impermissible only because of the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-8-305 (2019) (authorizing construction on the
capitol complex of a monument “in memory of the victims of abortion, babies, women, and men”).
69. See ALA. CONST. amend. 930 (expressing public policy “to ensure the protection of the rights
of the unborn child in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate”); IDAHO CODE § 18-601
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have enacted statutes extending the protection of the law to unborn children
(outside the context of abortion).70
(4) Six states—Arizona, Michigan, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin—have not repealed their pre-Roe statutes which prohibit abortion
except to save the life of the mother.71
(5) Four states—Alabama, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Utah—have all,
at one time or another, enacted post-Roe statutes that purported to prohibit
(2019) (declaring public policy “that all state statutes, rules and constitutional provisions shall be
interpreted to prefer, by all legal means, live childbirth over abortion”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6732(b)
(2019) (declaring that “the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on
behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges and immunities
available to other persons, citizens and residents of this state,” subject to state and federal
constitutional provisions); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (2019) (stating substantially the same as
Kansas); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102 (2019) (reaffirming the intent of the state of Montana “to
extend the protection of the laws of Montana in favor of all human life”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3202(c) (West 2019) (same).
70. In criminal law, thirty states have defined the unlawful killing of an unborn child as a form of
homicide, regardless of the stage of pregnancy at which the injury causing death was inflicted. See
Linton & Quinlan, supra note 46, at 321 n.205 (2019) (citing and cross-referencing citations to statutes
enacted in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). And fifteen states have recognized a cause of action for
wrongful death for intentional, willful, or negligent conduct that causes the death of an unborn child
without regard to the stage of pregnancy when the injury causing death occurred. Id. at 324 n.219
(citing and cross-referencing citations to statutes and court decisions from Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Texas,
Virginia, and West Virginia).
71. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3603, 13-3604 (LexisNexis 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.14 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 861–62 (West 2002); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4512.1, 4512.2, 4512.3, 4512.4, 4512.6 (West 1976); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-8 (2014); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 2005). Of course, these statutes are not currently enforceable. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (making state statutes that prohibit abortion unconstitutional and thus
unenforceable). Although the pre-Roe Texas statutes have not been reprinted in the current volumes
of either the Texas Revised Civil Statutes or the Texas Penal Code, they have not been expressly
repealed. Id. In McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 2004), however, the Fifth Circuit held that
the pre-Roe statutes prohibiting abortion have been repealed by implication with the enactment of
post-Roe statutes and rules regulating abortion. Id. at 849. The court’s analysis is superficial and
unpersuasive (e.g., one of the three laws the court cited in support of its repeal-by-implication analysis
was an administrative regulation, not a statute) and, in any event, would not be binding upon a Texas
state court. Id. Two state courts—the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court—
have rejected “repeal-by-implication” arguments made against their pre-Roe statutes. See People v.
Higuera, 625 N.W.2d 444, 448–49 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Black, 526 N.W.2d 132, 134–35
(Wis. 1994); see also David M. Smolin, The Status of Existing Abortion Prohibitions in a Legal World
Without Roe: Applying the Doctrine of Implied Repeal to Abortion, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 385
(1992) (discussing doctrine of repeal by implication).
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abortion throughout pregnancy: the Rhode Island statute was enacted shortly
after Roe,72 the Louisiana and Utah statutes were enacted after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services73 but before
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,74 and the Alabama statute was enacted in
2019.75 All four have been declared unconstitutional and/or enjoined,76 and
three of them have been repealed (the challenge to the Alabama statute is
ongoing).77
(6) Ten states—Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah—have enacted
statutes that would go into effect and prohibit most abortions throughout
pregnancy upon the overruling of Roe v. Wade (or the adoption of a federal
constitutional amendment that would permit such legislation).78
(7) Ten states—Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, and Tennessee—have enacted
statutes prohibiting abortion after the unborn child has a detectable heartbeat
(usually between the sixth and ninth week of pregnancy). None of these
statutes is currently in force.79
72. 1973 R.I. Pub. Laws 67, 68, ch. 15.
73. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
74. 1991 La. Acts 26 (prohibiting abortion except under specified circumstances); 1991 Utah
Legis. Serv. ch. 1 (West) (amended by S.B. 4, 1991 Legis., 1st Spec. Sess. (Utah 1991)).
75. Alabama Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 314, 189th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019).
76. See Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193 (D. R.I. 1973), aff’d, 482 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1973);
Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. La. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Sojourner T. v. Edwards,
974 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1992); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137
(1996), on remand, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Marshall, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1053,
1059–60 (M.D. Ala. 2019) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction).
77. Louisiana and Utah, as noted in the next paragraph, have enacted laws that would prohibit most
abortions upon the overruling of Roe (or the adoption of a federal constitutional amendment that would
allow such legislation).
78. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-301 et seq. (2019) (the “Arkansas Human Life Protection Act”);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-622 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.772 (West 2020); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1061 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-45 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.017 (2020) (the
“Right to Life of the Unborn Child Act”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-12 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-17-5.1 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-213 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7a-101 et
seq. (West 2020). The author drafted the Idaho and Tennessee statutes. The Mississippi statute might
be unenforceable on state constitutional grounds, however. See Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice,
716 So.2d 645, 650–54 (Miss. 1998) (recognizing a state privacy right to abortion).
79. See Paul Benjamin Linton, The Pro-Life Movement At (Almost) Fifty: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 18 AVE MARIA L. REV. 15, 21–-22 & nn. 35–-38 (2020) [hereinafter Pro-Life Movement]
(listing states and status of litigation challenging statutes); see also SisterSong Women of Color
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(8) Twenty-three states have enacted statutes prohibiting abortion at
various stages of gestation up to twenty weeks of gestation, which is before
viability.80 Most of the statutes that prohibit abortion after twenty weeks have
not been challenged.81
(9) Finally, sixteen states have prohibited abortions sought because of the
race, gender, and/or disability of the unborn child.82 When challenged, these
statutes have been declared unconstitutional and/or enjoined.83
In sum, since Roe v. Wade, thirty-nine states have adopted resolutions
Reprod. Justice Collective v. Kemp, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (declaring §§ 3 and 4 of
Georgia’s H.B. 481, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2019) unconstitutional and permanently
enjoining their enforcement); Memphis Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slatery, No. 3:20-cv-00501, 2020
WL 3957792 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (granting a temporary restraining order (July 13, 2020) and
preliminary injunction (July 24, 2020), enjoining Tennessee’s H.B. 2263/S.B. 2196, 111th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Tenn. 2020) (enacting, inter alia, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-216(c)(1))).
80. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Pro-Life Movement, supra
note 79, at 22–25 & nn.39–56 (listing statutes and status of litigation); see also H.B. 2263, 111th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Tenn. 2020) (enacting, inter alia, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-216(c)(2)–(8)
(banning abortions at six, eight, ten, twelve, fifteen, eighteen, and twenty weeks, respectively)). The
same bill also prohibits abortion at twenty-one weeks, twenty-two weeks, twenty-three weeks, and
twenty-four weeks. Id. (enacting TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-216(c)(9)–(12)).
81. This may be attributable to the fact that few or no late-term abortions are performed in many
of these states. See Paul Benjamin Linton, Twenty-Week Abortion Bans: Ineffective, Unconstitutional
and Unwise, 30 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 83 (2016) (discussing incidence of late-term abortions in states that
have enacted twenty-week abortion bans). Five of these statutes have been challenged, however, and
have been declared unconstitutional, enjoined, or both with respect to their previability applications.
See Pro-Life Movement, supra note 79, at 24–25 & nn.57–60 (discussing litigation). The Eighth
Circuit has recently affirmed the preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Arkansas
eighteen-week abortion ban. See Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, No. 19-2690, 2021
WL 29484 (8th Cir. Jan. 5, 2021), aff’g 397 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (E.D. Ark. 2019). For Tennessee, see
Memphis Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slatery, No. 3:20-cv-00501, 2020 WL 3957792 (M.D. Tenn.
2020) (enjoining previability applications of Tennessee bill).
82. Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See
Pro-Life Movement, supra note 79, at 25–26 & nn.61–62, 66 (citing statutes); see also H.B. 1295,
2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2020) (enacting the “Life Equality Act of 2020”); H.B. 2263, 111th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2020) (enacting, inter alia, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-217(b), (c), (d)
(banning abortions because of the sex, race, or disability of the unborn child (e.g., Down Syndrome),
respectively)).
83. Pro-Life Movement, supra note 79, at 25–26 & nn.63–65, 67 (citing litigation). In the same
opinion in which it affirmed the preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Arkansas eighteenweek abortion ban, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of
the State’s ban on Down Syndrome abortions. See Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 2021 WL
29484. For Tennessee, see Memphis Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 2020 WL 3957792 (enjoining categorybased bans).
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calling for a federal constitutional amendment to overturn Roe v. Wade, have
recognized that unborn human life deserves legal protection from the moment
of conception, or have enacted statutes that directly conflict with the viability
rule—that, regardless of reason, the states may not prohibit abortions before
viability.84 Of these thirty-nine states, five have subsequently enacted statutes
that codify Roe v. Wade and affirmatively recognize a state (statutory) right
to abortion.85 Excluding those five states, the legislatures of thirty-four States,
in one respect or another, have rejected Roe and its refusal to recognize that
unborn human life is worthy of legal protection, whether in the context of
abortion or otherwise.86
IV. CONCLUSION
In the fifty years since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, more than
two-thirds of the States have challenged the rationale and the results of the Court’s
opinion. That fact is striking. It strongly suggests that, contrary to the Court’s
attempt to end the debate over abortion, neither the American people nor their
elected representatives have agreed to forgo their opposition to abortion “by
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”87 In Casey, the Court
called the “contending sides of a national controversy to end their national
division” by submitting to the Court’s interpretation of what the Constitution
purportedly mandates.88 That interpretation forbids the states from prohibiting
any abortions before viability. It is remarkable, therefore, that almost all of the
statutes the states have enacted since Roe that prohibit some or most abortions
before viability were enacted after the Court reaffirmed the viability rule in Casey.
84. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
85. See supra note 61 (citing the statutes enacted in Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, and
Rhode Island). Similar statutes have been enacted in several states that have never questioned or
challenged Roe. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123460 et seq. (West 2003) (“Reproductive
Privacy Act”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-602(a) (West 2003); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2599aa et seq. (McKinney 2010) (“Reproductive Health Act”); 2017 Or. Laws, ch. 721, § 8 (“Reproductive
Health Equity Act”); VT. CODE ANN., tit. 18, § 9493 et seq. (2019) (“Freedom of Choice Act”); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.02.100, 9.02.110 (West 1991).
86. See supra note 84 (listing all of the thirty-four states except Delaware, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, and Rhode Island).
87. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
88. Id.
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The Supreme Court cannot continue to ignore the states’, and the American
people’s, persistent, longstanding, and overwhelming repudiation of its flawed
interpretation of the Constitution while pretending that it has “settled” the issue
of abortion. In Roe, the Court seriously and gravely misread the direction in which
the country was moving on the subject of abortion, a misreading that provided
critical support for its recognition of a virtually unlimited right to abortion. As in
the case of the death penalty, the Court should revisit its premises, overrule Roe,
and return the issue of abortion to where it properly belongs—to the American
people and their elected representatives.
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APPENDIX A•
Appendix A contains a list of bills introduced, but not enacted, before Roe
v. Wade was decided that would have allowed abortions to be performed under
broader circumstances than permitted under existing law.

• The author wishes to express his appreciation to Ryan S. Joslin, Esq., who, as a summer intern
at Americans United for Life, compiled a list of most of the bills described in this appendix and
obtained copies of many of those bills. The author also appreciates the assistance of Michael Taylor,
past Executive Secretary of the National Right to Life Committee, and the Dr. Joseph R. Stanton
Human Life Issues Archives, in bringing to the author’s attention a number of pre-Roe abortion bills.
Finally, the author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of state legislative reference bureau staffs,
state librarians and archivists, and, especially, Steve Harrison, Clerk of the West Virginia House of
Delegates, in securing copies of numerous pre-Roe abortion bills described herein.
 None of the bills described in the appendix, as introduced or amended, was enacted (except for
three recodifications of state criminal laws that were enacted without any language weakening existing
protections of unborn human life). The description of the bills is limited to explaining on what grounds
(if any were specified) an abortion could be performed, by whom (a licensed physician and/or the
pregnant woman herself), and whether there were any limitations on the stage of pregnancy at which
the procedure could be performed. The description does not discuss provisions that related to the
consent required (if any) by a married woman’s husband or by the parents of a minor; whether there
was a residency requirement; whether the approval of a hospital committee was required; or any other
statutory requirements. Without using quotation marks, the descriptions generally track the actual
language used in the bills.
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H.B. 472

S.B. 322

H.B. 81

1967 Reg.
Sess.

1967 Reg.
Sess.

1967 Reg.
Sess.

Life or Health of
the Mother

Alabama

Bill No.

Year of
Session

Reasons for Which
Abortions Were
Permitted Under
Existing Law at
Time Roe v. Wade
was Decided

State

284
same as H.B. 472

same as H.B. 472

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician before the sixteenth week of
pregnancy if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest, or at any stage of pregnancy
if continuation of pregnancy would likely
result in the death of the woman, serious
permanent impairment of her physical or
mental health, or the birth of a child with
grave and permanent physical deformity or
mental retardation

Description of Bill
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Arizona

Life of the Mother

same as S.B. 75

same as S.B. 75

H.B. 96

H.B. 32

28th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess.
(1968)
29th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess.
(1969)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was a substantial risk that
continuation of the pregnancy would
seriously impair the physical or mental
health of the woman; if there was a
substantial risk that the child would be
born with serious physical or mental
defect; or if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest

S.B. 75

28th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess.
(1968)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was substantial risk that continuance
of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother; if
there was substantial risk that the child
would be born with grave physical or
mental defect; or if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest

S.B.26

28th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess.
(1967)
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285

286
29th Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess.
(1970)

29th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess.
(1969)

29th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess.
(1969)

would have amended existing law to allow
a licensed physician to perform an abortion
for any reason at any stage of pregnancy

same as H.B. 172

H.B. 20

same as S.B. 75

H.B. 172

S.B. 69
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Connecticut

Life of the Mother
Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1969)

30th Leg.
1st Reg. Sess.
(1971)

30th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

29th Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess.
(1970)

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if continuance of the pregnancy
could threaten the mental or physical
health or life of the mother; if the infant
might be born with incapacitating physical
deformity or mental deficiency; or if

would have repealed existing laws, thereby
allowing an abortion to be performed for
any reason at any stage of pregnancy

H.B. 51

H.B. 5490

same as S.B. 216

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician within the first nineteen weeks
of gestation if continuation of the
pregnancy was likely to result in the death
of the woman or grave impairment to her
physical or mental health, or at any stage
of pregnancy if there was significant risk
that continuance of the pregnancy would
seriously endanger the life of the mother

S.B. 123

S.B.216
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287

288
would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician (or by the pregnant
woman herself) for any reason within the
first twenty-four weeks from the
commencement of her pregnancy, or at any
stage of the pregnancy to preserve the life
of the woman

same as S.B. 331

would have repealed existing laws, thereby
allowing abortions to be performed for any
reason at any stage of pregnancy

S.B. 331

H.B. 8349

H.B. 7576

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1971)

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1971)

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1971)

continuance of a pregnancy, resulting from
rape or incest, could constitute a threat to
the mental or physical health of the mother
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would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason within
the first twenty-four weeks from the
commencement of the pregnancy, or at any
state of pregnancy to preserve the life of
the woman

would have effectively repealed existing
law and allowed an abortion to be
performed by a licensed physician for any
reason at any stage of pregnancy

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason within
the first twelve weeks from the onset of
pregnancy, or at any stage of pregnancy to
preserve the life of the woman
would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason within
the first twenty weeks from the
commencement of the woman's pregnancy,
or at any stage of pregnancy to preserve
the life of the woman

S.B. 501

H.B. 6001

H.B. 6003

H.B. 6004

Gen.
Assemb.,
May Spec.
Sess. (1972)

Gen.
Assemb.,
May Spec.
Sess. (1972)

Gen.
Assemb.,
May Spec.
Sess. (1972)

Gen.
Assemb.,
May Spec.
Sess. (1972)
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289

Idaho

Life of the Mother

290
41st Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess.
(1972)

41st Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

41st Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician if the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest and the
abortion was performed within twelve
weeks of the rape or incest that resulted in
the pregnancy, or at any stage of
pregnancy if the pregnancy would
endanger the life of the mother

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason before
the tenth week of pregnancy, or at any
stage of the pregnancy if the health of the
female was in grave danger
S.B. 1345

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if continuation of the pregnancy
would endanger the life of the mother, or if
the abortion were determined to be
"justifiable," a term not defined in the bill

H.B. 109

S.B. 1221
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Illinois

Life of the Mother

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason at any stage of
pregnancy (bill was later amended to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician before the sixteenth week of
gestation if continuation of the pregnancy
was likely to result in the serious
permanent impairment of the physical or
mental health of the woman or if the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or
at any stage of pregnancy if continuation
of the pregnancy was likely to result in the
death of the woman or the birth of a child
with grave and permanent physical
deformity or mental retardation)

would have changed existing law to allow
the Department of Public Health to
establish general rules and regulations
concerning the terminations of pregnancies
by licensed physicians in licensed hospitals
(bill was later amended to allow an
abortion to be performed by a licensed

S.B. 603

H.B. 633

76th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

76th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)
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291

292
would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason at any stage of
pregnancy

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason at any
stage of pregnancy (bill was later amended
to allow an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician before the sixteenth
week of gestation if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest, or at any stage of
pregnancy if continuation of the pregnancy
was likely to result in the death of the
woman or serious permanent impairment
of her physical or mental health, or the
birth of a child with grave and permanent
physical deformity or mental retardation)

H.B. 634

H.B. 663

76th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

76th Gen.
Assemb.
(1969)

physician if a continued pregnancy would
likely result in the serious impairment of
the pregnant female's physical or mental
health and the pregnant female made
arrangements for a hospital admission no
later than twelve weeks after gestation)
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would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician within the first twenty
weeks of gestation for any reason, and
after the first twenty weeks if the abortion
was necessary to preserve the life of the
pregnant female; if continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely endanger and
impair the physical or mental health of the
female; or if there was substantial risk that
the child would be grossly malformed or
seriously impaired in physical or mental
capacities

same as H.B. 1407 (bill was later amended
to allow an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician during the first trimester
of pregnancy for any reason, and after the
first trimester if continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely endanger and
impair the physical or mental health of the
female, or if there was substantial risk that
the child would be grossly malformed or
seriously impaired in physical or mental
capacities)

H.B. 1407

H.B. 43

76th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

77th Gen.
Assemb.
(1971)
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293

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason within twelve
weeks from the commencement of the
woman's pregnancy, and within twenty
weeks from the commencement of pregnancy if the abortion was necessary for the
preservation of the woman's health or life
would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason within twelve
weeks from the commencement of
pregnancy
would have changed existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason within the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy
same as H.B. 633 (as originally
introduced)

same as H.B. 633 (as originally
introduced)

H.B. 853

H.B. 1552

H.B. 1865

H.B. 2838

H.B. 3075

77th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

77th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)
77th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)
77th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

77th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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Indiana

Life of the Mother
H.B. 1621

S.B. 748

77th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)
1967 Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Reg. Sess.
(1967)

H.B. 3076

77th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
termination of the pregnancy was
necessary to avoid serious danger to the
life or health of the pregnant woman (the
determination of which could take into
account social conditions and other
circumstances that could affect her health;
if there was substantial risk that the child
could be born with grave physical or
mental defect; if the pregnant woman was
mentally defective; or if the pregnancy

same as H.B. 1552

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician within twelve weeks from the
commencement of pregnancy if the
abortion was necessary for the mental or
physical well-being of the woman, or
within twenty weeks from the
commencement of pregnancy if the
abortion was necessary for the preservation
of the woman's life
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295

Iowa

Life of the Mother
62d Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1967)

Senate File
645

296
would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if there was substantial risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother; if the child would be
born with grave physical or mental defect;
or if the pregnancy resulted from rape,
incest, or other felonious intercourse (bill
was later substantially amended, passed by
both chambers of the legislature, and
vetoed by the Governor)

resulted from rape or incest (bill was later
substantially amended to allow an abortion
to be performed by a licensed physician
only if termination of the pregnancy was
necessary to avoid serious danger to the
life of the pregnant woman or if the
pregnancy resulted from an act of rape or
incest; the bill, so amended, passed the
legislature but was vetoed by the
Governor)
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would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if continuance of the pregnancy
could threaten the life or the mental or
physical health of the woman; or could
result in the birth of an infant with
incapacitating physical deformity or
mental deficiency; or if the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest
same as S.F. 202

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy when necessary to preserve the
health of the woman

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason at any
stage of pregnancy

S.F. 202

H.F. 261

S.F. 502

S.F. 584

63d Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969–1970)

63d Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969–1970)
63d Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969–1970)

63d Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969–1970)

[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
Overruling Roe v. Wade
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

297

298
H.F. 626

S.F. 114

H.F 134

64th Gen.
Assemb.
(1971–1972)

64th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971–1972)

S.F. 1052

63d Gen.
Assemb.
(1969–1970)

63d Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969–1970)

same as S.F. 114 (bill was later amended to
allow an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason within
twelve weeks from the commencement of
the pregnancy or at any stage of pregnancy
to save the life of the pregnant female
person)

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason before
the twentieth week of gestation

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy to preserve the woman's health

same as S.F. 584
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Kentucky

Life of the Mother

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was substantial risk that continuance
of the pregnancy would threaten the life or
gravely impair the health of the woman; if
there was substantial risk that the child
would be born with grave physical or
mental defect; or if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest
Section 276 of a comprehensive revision
and codification of the Commonwealth's
criminal laws would have amended
existing law to allow an abortion to be
performed by a licensed physician at any
stage of pregnancy if termination of the
pregnancy was necessary to preserve the
life of the female; if continuance of the
pregnancy would constitute a substantial

H.B. 197

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1972)

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician if continuance of the
pregnancy could threaten the life or the
mental health of the woman or result in the
birth of an infant with incapacitating
physical deformity or mental deficiency; or
if the pregnancy resulted from rape or
incest

H.B. 120

S.F. 344

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1968)

64th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971–1972)
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299

Maine

Life of the Mother

300
Senate
Paper 215
(Legis.
Doc. 478)

S.P. 667
(Legis.
Doc. 1695)

103d Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
(1967)

103d Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
(1967)

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician before the sixteenth
week of gestation if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest, or at any stage of
pregnancy if continuation of the pregnancy
would probably result in the death of the
woman, or the serious permanent

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if there was substantial risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother or that the child would
be born with grave physical or mental
defect; or that the pregnancy resulted from
rape, incest or other felonious intercourse

risk that the physical or mental health of
the mother would be seriously impaired; if
there was a substantial risk that the fetus
would be born with a serious physical or
mental defect; or if the pregnancy resulted
from rape, incest or other felonious
intercourse (the amendment to the pre-Roe
abortion law was deleted in the bill that
was enacted, Ky. Acts ch. 385 (1972)).
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H.P. 602
(Legis.
Doc. 783)

H.P. 100
(Legis.
Doc. 144)

104th Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

105th Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

would have repealed existing law, thereby
allowing abortions to be performed for any
reason at any stage of pregnancy

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician before the twenty-sixth
week of gestation if there was a substantial
risk that continuation of the pregnancy
would gravely impair the physical or
mental health of the mother, or the birth of
a child with grave and permanent physical
deformity or mental retardation; or if the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; or
at any stage of pregnancy if continuation
of the pregnancy was likely to result in the
death of the mother

impairment of the physical health of the
woman, or the birth of a child with grave
and permanent mental or physical infirmity
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301

302
105th Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

105th Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

105th Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician during the first twenty
weeks of gestation if the procedure was
determined to be in the best interests of the
patient's welfare, or at any stage of
pregnancy to save the life of the mother

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason during
the first twenty weeks of gestation, or at
any stage of pregnancy to save the
mother's life

H.P. 1024
(Legis.
Doc. 1406)

H.P. 1324
(Legis.
Doc. 1736)

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician during the first trimester
if there was a substantial risk that
continuation of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother; if there was
substantial risk of the birth of the child
with grave and permanent deformity or
mental retardation; or if the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest; or at any stage
of pregnancy if continuation of the
pregnancy was likely to result in the death
of the mother

H.P. 1157
(Legis.
Doc. 1373)
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Massachusetts

law prohibited
"unlawful"
abortions
(interpreted by the
Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial
Court to include
the physical or
mental health of
the mother)

165th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1968)

165th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1968)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was substantial risk that continuance
of the pregnancy would seriously impair
the physical or mental health of the mother
or that the child would be born with
serious physical or mental defect, or if the
pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or
other felonious intercourse (including all
illicit intercourse with a girl below the age
of sixteen); or if continuance of the
pregnancy would adversely affect in a
serious manner the future well-being of the
pregnant woman and/or her other children
would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician before the sixteenth week of
gestation if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest, or at any stage of pregnancy
if the pregnancy was likely to result in the
death of the woman, or serious permanent
impairment of her physical or mental
health, or the birth of a child with grave
and permanent physical deformity or
mental retardation

H. 1914

H. 3728
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303

304
H. 1684

H. 1113

H. 3680

166th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1970)

167th Gen.
Court, 1st
Sess. (1971)

H. 3362

166th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1970)

166th Gen.
Court, 1st
Sess. (1969)

same in substance as H. 1113

would have repealed existing laws, thereby
allowing an abortion to be performed for
any reason at any stage of pregnancy

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if the
pregnancy would result in the death of the
mother, impair her mental health, if the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or
if the pregnancy could result in the birth of
a child with mental or physical handicap;
also would have allowed an abortion to be
performed by a licensed physician on any
married woman who wanted no more
children and any unmarried woman who
was unwilling to bear an illegitimate child

same as H. 3728
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H. 4504

S. 996

H. 635

H. 3431

H. 4182

167th Gen.
Court, 1st
Sess. (1971)
167th Gen.
Court, 1st
Sess. (1971)
167th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1972)
167th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1972)

167th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1972)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason at any stage of
pregnancy

would have amended existing law to
permit an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if it was necessary to preserve
the woman from an imminent physical or
mental peril that would substantially
endanger her life

same as H. 1113

same as H. 1113

same in substance as H. 1113
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Michigan

Life of the Mother
74th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1967)

167th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1972)

167th Gen.
Court, 2d
Sess. (1972)

S.B. 568

S. 842

H. 4764

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if termination of the pregnancy
was necessary for the preservation of the
physical or mental health of the mother or
if there was a substantial risk that the child
would be born with a grave physical or
mental defect, or if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest

same as H. 1113

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
continuation of the pregnancy would cause
grave and certain danger to the life of the
pregnant woman and/or would seriously
and certainly endanger her physical or
mental health
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S.B. 287

S.B. 288

S.B. 374

75th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1969)

75th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1969)

75th Leg., 1st
Sess.(1969)

substantially the same as S.B. 288

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason at any stage of
pregnancy

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician before the nineteenth week of
pregnancy if there was significant risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would
seriously impair the physical or mental
health of the mother, if the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest, or if there was
significant risk that the child would be
born with serious physical or mental
defect; or at any stage of pregnancy if there
was significant risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would seriously endanger the
life of the mother
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308
S.B. 1260

S.B. 3

76th Leg., 1st
Sess.(1971)

H.B. 3364

75th Leg., 2d
Sess. (1970)

75th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1969)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed for any reason
if the period of gestation had not exceeded
four lunar months (sixteen weeks), or at
any stage of pregnancy if continuance of
the pregnancy would constitute a
significant danger to the life of the mother
(bill was later amended to allow an
abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason if the period of
gestation had not exceeded ninety days, or
at any stage of pregnancy if continuance of
the pregnancy would constitute a
significant risk of serious danger to the
mental or physical health of the woman;

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason during the first
three months of pregnancy, and at any time
of pregnancy if there was significant risk
that continuance of the pregnancy would
seriously endanger the mental or physical
health of the woman

same as S.B. 287
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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S.B. 149

S.B. 220

S.B. 483

H.B. 4004

76th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1971)

76th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1971)

76th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1971)

76th Leg., 2d
Sess. (1972)

an amendment offered to a recodification
of the State’ s criminal law would have
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason within
the first ninety days of gestation, and at
any stage of pregnancy if continuance of
the pregnancy would constitute a
significant risk of serious danger to the
mental or physical health of the woman or
there was a significant risk that the fetus

same as S.B. 3, as amended

would have amended existing law to
eliminate basing a manslaughter charge on
the performance of an illegal abortion

would have repealed existing law, thereby
allowing an abortion to be performed for
any reason at any stage of pregnancy

or if there was a significant risk that the
fetus would be born with serious mental or
physical impairment, defect or deficiency)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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310

Minnesota

Life of the Mother

Senate File
930

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was a substantial risk that
continuation of the pregnancy would

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason during the first
twenty weeks of gestation; measure was
rejected by three-fifths of the electorate
(39.35% for and 60.65% against) (See
Michigan Abortion Legalization Initiative,
Proposal B, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Abortion_Legali
zation_Initiative,_Proposal_B_(1972) (last
visited Nov. 24, 2020))

Proposal B

Indirect
Initiated
State Statute
(Nov. 7,
1972)

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1967)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason at any stage of
pregnancy

H.B. 6110

76th Leg., 2d
Sess. (1972)

would be born with serious mental or
physical impairment, defect or deficiency
(amendment was defeated and
recodification passed)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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S.F. 998

S.F. 1025

H.F. 588
S.F. 430

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1969)

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1969)
Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)
Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)

same as H.F. 588

substantially the same as S.F. 998

substantially the same as S.F. 998

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason at any stage of
pregnancy

gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother or that the child would
be born with grave physical or mental
defect, or if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or from incest (bill was later amended
to allow an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if continuation of the pregnancy
was likely to result in the death of the
woman, serious, permanent impairment of
her physical or mental health, or the birth
of the child with grave and permanent
physical deformity, or mental retardation)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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Mississippi

Life of the Mother,
Rape

312
H.B. 468

H.B. 204

H.B. 1036

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1972)

S.F. 757

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician if the pregnancy resulted from
forcible or statutory rape or incest (existing

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason within twentyfour weeks from the commencement of the
woman's pregnancy, or at any stage of
pregnancy to preserve her life

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was a probability that the infant
would be born deformed or mentally
defective; if it was necessary to preserve
the mother's physical or mental health or if
there was a serious threat to the mother's
physical or mental health if the pregnancy
continued; or if the pregnancy resulted
from incest

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy based
on undefined "medical indications"
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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Missouri

Life of the Mother
S.B. 356

S.B. 206

75th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

S.B. 2157

74th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1967)

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1972)

would have repealed existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician if continuance of the pregnancy
would impair the health of the mother or if
the child would be born with a grave
permanent physical defect; or if the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician at any stage of
pregnancy if there was substantial risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother or that the child would
be born with grave physical or mental
defect; or if the pregnancy resulted from
rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse
(bill was later amended to eliminate the
exceptions for mental health, rape, incest,
or other felonious intercourse)

same as H.B. 1036

law permitted abortion only in case of
forcible rape or to save the life of the
mother)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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314
42d Legis.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)
77th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess.
(1967)

Leg., 55th
Sess. (1969)

Life of the Mother

Life of the Mother

Life of the Mother

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

76th Gen.
Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

Assemb.
B. 155

Legis. B.
45

H.B. 554

H.B. 650

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was substantial risk that continuance
of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical health of the mother, or that the
child would be born with grave physical or

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician during the first twentysix weeks of pregnancy if there was
substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother or
that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect, or the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason at any
stage of pregnancy

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason before
viability
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
Overruling Roe v. Wade
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Assemb.
B. 229

Assemb.
B. 259

Assemb.
B. 4

Leg., 55th
Sess. (1969)

Leg., 55th
Sess. (1969)

1971 Leg.,
56th Sess.
(1971)

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason at any
stage of pregnancy (bill was later amended
to allow an abortion after viability only to
preserve the woman’ s life)

would have amended existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason at any
stage of pregnancy

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
continuation of the pregnancy could
threaten the life of the woman or seriously
impair her health; if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest; or continuation of the
pregnancy could result in the birth of a
child with grave physical deformities or
with mental retardation

mental defects; or if the pregnancy resulted
from forcible rape or incest
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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New
Hampshire

Life of the Mother

316
H.B. 77

H.B. 239

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)

S.B. 494

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1969)

Leg., 56th
Sess. (1971)

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician during the first twentyfour weeks of pregnancy if the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest, if the child
was likely to be born with serious physical
or mental defects, or continuation of the
pregnancy was likely to result in the

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician before sixteen weeks of
pregnancy if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest, or any stage of pregnancy if
continuation of the pregnancy was more
than likely to result in the death of the
woman, serious permanent impairment of
her physical or mental health, or the birth
of a child with grave and permanent
physical deformity or mental retardation

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason before
viability and, after viability, to preserve the
woman's life
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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New Jersey

Life of the Mother
(as interpreted by
the New Jersey
Supreme Court)
Assemb.
1111

H.B. 252

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

H.B. 240

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was a substantial risk that the child, if
born, would have a grave physical or
mental defect by reason of the exposure of
the woman to German measles (rubella)
during her pregnancy

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician if the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest; if the child
was likely to be born with serious physical
or mental defects; or if continuation of the
pregnancy was likely to result in the
serious impairment of the physical or
mental health of the woman

would have amended existing laws to
allow an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician (or by the pregnant
woman herself) for any reason within the
first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy, or at
any stage of pregnancy to preserve her life

serious impairment of the physical or
mental health of the woman; or at any
stage of pregnancy to preserve the life of
the pregnant woman
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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Assemb.
762

Assemb.
757

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1970)

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1972)

318
would have allowed an abortion to be
performed by a licensed physician (or the
pregnant woman herself) for any reason
within twenty-four weeks from the
commencement of pregnancy, or at any
stage of pregnancy to preserve the
woman's life

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician during the first ninety
days of pregnancy if there was substantial
risk that continuance of the pregnancy
would greatly impair the physical or
mental health of the female; if the child
would be born with serious physical or
mental defect, such that he would be
permanently incapable of caring for
himself; if the pregnancy resulted from
illegal intercourse; or if the woman was
unmarried and the pregnancy commenced
while she was under the age of 16 years
and was still unmarried at the time the
abortion was to be performed; or at any
stage of pregnancy if necessary to preserve
the life of the female
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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North
Dakota

Life of the Mother
H.B. 319

H.B. 1500

Leg., 41st
Sess. (1969)

Leg., 42nd
Sess. (1971)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician before the sixteenth week of
gestation if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest, or at any stage of pregnancy
if continuation of the pregnancy was likely
to be a detriment to a woman's right to life
and would result in the death of the
woman, including death from suicide, or
the serious permanent impairment of the
woman's health, including her physical and
"psychotic [sic]" condition; or if
continuation of the pregnancy would result

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician before the sixteenth week of
gestation if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest, or at any stage of pregnancy
if continuation of the pregnancy was likely
to result in the death of the woman, the
serious permanent impairment of the
physical health of the woman, or the
serious permanent impairment of the
mental health of the woman, or the birth of
a child with grave and permanent physical
deformity or mental retardation (bill was
later amended to delete mental health
exception)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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Ohio

Life of the Mother

320
H.B. 408

H.B. 71

108th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

Measure 1

107th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1967)

Citizen
Initiated
State Statute
(Nov. 7,
1972)

same as H.B. 408

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was a substantial risk that the
continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother or that the child would
be born with grave physical or mental
defects, or if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or from incest

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason through the
twentieth week of gestation; measure was
rejected by three-fourths of the electorate
(23.41% for, 76.59% against) (See North
Dakota Abortion Initiative, Measure 1,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
North_Dakota_Abortion_Initiative,_Measu
re_1_(1972) (last visited Nov. 24, 2020))

in the birth of a child with grave and
permanent physical deformity or mental
retardation
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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H.B. 1116

H.B. 67

H.B. 72

Sub. H.B.
511

109th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)
109th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

109th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

109th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1972)

an amendment offered to a recodification
of the state’ s criminal law would have
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason during
the first nineteen weeks of pregnancy and
at any stage of pregnancy to save the life
of the mother (amendment was tabbed and
recodification passed)

would have repealed existing laws, thereby
allowing an abortion to be performed for
any reason at any stage of pregnancy

would have amended existing law to allow
a licensed physician to perform an abortion
for any reason at any stage of pregnancy

would have repealed existing law and
allowed abortion to be performed for any
reason at any stage of pregnancy
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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Oklahoma

Life of the Mother

322
33d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

31st Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess.
(1967)

H.B. 1408

H.B. 710

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason within fifteen
weeks from the commencement of
pregnancy or at any stage of pregnancy to
preserve her life

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
continuance of the pregnancy would
involve serious risk to the life or of grave
injury to the health, whether physical or
mental, of the pregnant woman whether
before, at, or after the birth of the child; if
there was a substantial risk that the child
would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped; or if the pregnant woman
was mentally defective or judged mentally
incompetent or became pregnant out of
wedlock while under the age of fifteen, or
became pregnant as a result of rape or
incest
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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Pennsylvania

law prohibited
"unlawful
abortions,"
(understood to
mean abortions
other than those
necessary to save
the life of the
mother)
Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

33d Leg. 2d
Reg. Sess.
(1972)

would have repealed existing law and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason within
twenty weeks of the commencement of
pregnancy or at any stage of pregnancy if
there was a substantial risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would
endanger the life of the mother or would
gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother; or that the child
would be born with grave physical or
mental defect; or if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest, or illicit intercourse
with a girl under the age of sixteen (16)
years of age

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician for any reason if
requested by the pregnant woman prior to
completion of sixteen weeks of pregnancy

S.B. 458

H.B. 536

[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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324

Rhode
Island

Life of the Mother

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician if there was substantial risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the woman or that the child
would be born with grave physical or
mental defect, or that the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest
same as H. 1653

H. 1069

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1967)

would have repealed existing laws, thereby
allowing an abortion to be performed for
any reason at any stage of pregnancy

S.B. 928

H. 1653

would have repealed existing laws and
allowed an abortion to be performed by a
licensed physician within the first sixteen
weeks of pregnancy if the continuation of
the pregnancy would result in the death of
the woman or if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest; or at any time of
pregnancy to save the life of the woman

S.B. 617

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1966)

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1971)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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would have amended existing law to allow
(in addition to the existing life-of-themother exception) an abortion to be
performed by a licensed physician at any
stage of pregnancy if the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest
would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was substantial risk that continuance
of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the woman or
that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect

same as H. 1716

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was substantial risk that continuance
of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the woman or
that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect, or that the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest

H. 1716

H. 1659

H. 1660

H. 1661

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1967)

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1968)

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1968)
Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1968)
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326

Tennessee

Life of the Mother
H.B. 931

S.B. 836

85th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1967–1968)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
continuation of the pregnancy was likely to
result in the death of the woman, or serious
permanent impairment of the health or
mental health of the woman, or the birth of
a child with a grave and permanent
physical deformity or mental retardation

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest

substantially the same as H. 1716

H. 1402

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1969)
85th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1967–1968)

same as H. 1659

same as H. 1661

H. 1401

H. 1400

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1969)

Gen.
Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (1969)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
continuance of the pregnancy could
threaten the life or gravely impair the
health of the woman; if the child could be
born with grave physical or mental defect;
or the pregnancy resulted from rape or
incest
same as S.B. 836

would have repealed existing laws, thereby
allowing abortions to be performed for any
reason at any stage of pregnancy

same as S.B. 836 (later amended to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician if continuance of the pregnancy
could threaten the life or gravely impair
the physical health of the woman; if the
child could be born with grave physical or
mental defect; or the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest)

S.B. 1338

H.B. 1005

H.B. 1615

H.B. 1288

85th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1967–1968)

85th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969–1970)
85th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969–1970)
85th Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969–1970)
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Texas

Life of the Mother

328
H.B. 323

H.B. 1092

Leg., 62d
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

S.B. 275

Leg., 61st
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

Leg., 60th
Reg. Sess.
(1967)

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason at any stage of
pregnancy

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was a substantial risk that
continuation of the pregnancy would
endanger the woman’ s life or gravely
impair her physical or mental health; if
there was a substantial risk that the child
would be born with a grave physical or
mental defect; or if the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; if
the procedure was necessary to preserve
the life of the woman; if there was
substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the woman; or
if there was a substantial risk that the child
would be born with grave physical or
mental defect
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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38th Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1969)

Life of the Mother

Life of the Mother

Utah

Vermont

Leg., 62d
Reg. Sess.
(1971)

H. 199

S.B. 116

S.B. 553

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
there was a substantial risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would
threaten the life or impair the health of the
woman or that the child would be born
with physical or mental defect; or if the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician before sixteen weeks of
pregnancy if the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest, or any stage of pregnancy if
continuation of the pregnancy was likely to
result in the death of the female, serious
permanent impairment of her physical or
mental health, or the birth of a child with
grave and permanent physical deformity or
mental retardation

same as H.B. 1092
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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would have allowed a pregnant woman to
obtain an abortion at any stage of
pregnancy upon application to a probate
judge for an "abortion certificate" if the
judge found that there was substantial risk
that unless an abortion was performed the
life of the applicant would be endangered;
or that her health would be impaired; or if
he found that the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest; no certificate was required
if a licensed physician believed that the
woman would suffer irreparable harm if
the abortion were delayed until an abortion
certificate could be obtained
would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason within twenty
weeks from the commencement of
pregnancy, or at any stage of pregnancy to
preserve the woman's life
would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician at any stage of pregnancy if
continuation of the pregnancy presented a
grave and substantial risk to the physical or
mental health of the woman

S. 161

H. 218

S. 170

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(Vt. 1970)

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1972)

Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(1970)
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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Assemb.
677

Assemb.
33

Assemb.
196

Assemb.
14

Assemb.
600

Legis. Sess.
(1967)

Legis. Sess.
(1969)

Legis. Sess.
(1969)

Legis. Sess.
(1971)

Legis. Sess.
(1971)

Life of the Mother

Wisconsin

H.B. 1028

Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971)

Life of the Mother

West
Virginia

same as Assemb. 677

same as Assemb. 677

same as Assemb. 677

same as Assemb. 677

would have repealed existing law, thereby
allowing abortions to be performed for any
reason at any stage of pregnancy

would have amended existing law to allow
an abortion to be performed by a licensed
physician for any reason at any stage of
pregnancy if the pregnant female had been
declared mentally incompetent
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Wyoming

Life of the Mother
Leg., 41st
Sess. (1971)
H.B. 246

would have repealed and reenacted
existing laws to allow an abortion to be
performed by a licensed physician (or by a
person appropriately trained and acting
under the direction or supervision of such
physician) for any reason at any stage
pregnancy
[Vol. 48: 261, 2021]
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APPENDIX B
Charts on State Legislative Responses to Roe v. Wade (1973):
States that Have Adopted Resolutions Calling on Congress to Convene a
Constitutional Convention for the Purpose of Proposing an Amendment to
the United States Constitution Prohibiting Abortion or Allowing the States
to Prohibit Abortion
States that Have Adopted Resolutions Asking Congress to Propose an
Amendment to the United States Constitution to Prohibit Abortion or Allow
the States to Prohibit Abortion
States that Have Recognized that Human Life Begins at Conception and
Deserves Legal Protection at All Stages of Biological Development
States that Have Not Repealed Their Pre-Roe Statutes Prohibiting Abortion
Except to Save the Life of the Mother
States that Enacted Statutes After Roe v. Wade Prohibiting Most Abortions
Throughout Pregnancy
States that Have Enacted Statutes that Would Take Effect upon the
Overruling of Roe v. Wade and Would Prohibit Most Abortions Throughout
Pregnancy
States that Enacted Statutes After Roe v. Wade Prohibiting Abortion After
the Unborn Child Has a Detectable Heartbeat
States that Enacted Statues After Roe v. Wade Prohibiting Abortion at
Various Stages of Gestation Before Twenty Weeks (all statutes are twentyweek bans unless otherwise noted)
States that Enacted Statues After Roe v. Wade Prohibiting Abortion Based
on the Race, Gender and/or the Disability of the Unborn Child
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States that Have
Adopted Resolutions
Asking Congress to
Propose an
Amendment to the
United States
Constitution to
Prohibit Abortion or
Allow the States to
Prohibit Abortion

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

Idaho

Illinois

States that Have
Adopted Resolutions
Calling on Congress
to Convene a
Constitutional
Convention for the
Purpose of Proposing
an Amendment to the
United States
Constitution
Prohibiting Abortion
or Allowing the States
to Prohibit Abortion

Alabama
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Arkansas

Delaware
(subsequently
rescinded)*

Idaho (subseqently
rescinded)*

Indiana

Florida

Arkansas

Arizona

Alaska

Alabama

States that Have
Recognized that
Human Life Begins at
Conception and
Deserves Legal
Protection at All
Stages of Biological
Development

West Virginia

Texas

Oklahoma

Michigan

Arizona

States that Have Not
Repealed Their PreRoe Statutes
Prohibiting Abortion
Except to Save the
Life of the Mother

Utah (repealed and
replaced with
contingency law)

Rhode Island
(repealed)

Louisiana (repealed
and replaced with
contingency law)

Alabama

States that Enacted
Statutes After Roe v.
Wade Prohibiting
Most Abortions
Throughout
Pregnancy
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Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Minnesota

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

Kentucky

Louisiana
(subsequently
rescinded)*

Massachusetts

Mississippi

Missouri

Nebraska

Nevada (subsequently
rescinded)*

New Jersey

Oklahoma
(subsequently
rescinded)*

Minnesota

Michigan

Louisiana

Kentucky

Kansas

Indiana

Illinois

Idaho

Georgia

Wisconsin
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Nebraska

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Dakota

Utah

West Virginia

Wisconsin

South Dakota
(subsequently
rescinded)*

Tennessee
(subsequently
rescinded)*

Utah (subsequently
rescinded)*

*For an explanation
of the rescissions, see
supra n. 62

Montana

Missouri

North Dakota

Rhode Island

Mississippi

New Jersey

Pennsylvania
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Wisconsin

West Virginia

Virginia

Utah

Texas

Tennessee

South Dakota

South Carolina
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States that Enacted Statutes
After Roe v. Wade Prohibiting
Abortion After the Unborn
Child Has a Detectable
Heartbeat

Arkansas

Georgia

Iowa

Kentucky

Louisiana

Mississippi

States that Have Enacted
Statutes that Would Take Effect
upon the Overruling of Roe v.
Wade and Would Prohibit Most
Abortions Throughout
Pregnancy

Arkansas
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Idaho

Kentucky

Louisiana

Mississippi

Missouri

Indiana

Idaho

Indiana

Illinois (repealed)

Kentucky

Kansas

Arkansas (18 weeks, 20 weeks)

Georgia

Arkansas

Arizona

States that Enacted Statues
After Roe v. Wade Prohibiting
Abortion Based on the Race,
Gender and/or the Disability of
the Unborn Child

Arizona

Alabama

States that Enacted Statues
After Roe v. Wade Prohibiting
Abortion at Various Stages of
Gestation Before Twenty
Weeks (all statutes are twentyweek bans unless otherwise
noted)
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Missouri

North Dakota

Ohio

Tennessee

North Dakota

South Dakota

Tennessee

Utah

Mississippi

Missouri

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

South Dakota

Louisiana (15 weeks, 20 weeks)

Mississippi (15 weeks, 20
weeks)
Missouri (8 weeks, 14 weeks,
18 weeks, 20 weeks)
Nebraska

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Louisiana

Kentucky

Kansas
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Wisconsin

West Virginia

Utah (18 weeks, 20 weeks)

Texas

Tennessee (6 weeks, 8 weeks,
10 weeks, 12 weeks, 15 weeks,
18 weeks, 20 weeks, 21 weeks,
22 weeks, 23 weeks, 24 weeks)

South Dakota

South Carolina

Oklahoma

Tennessee
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